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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdiction is proper in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code §78-2a3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1
Did the Trial Court correctly award attorney's fees to the Appellee?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The appellate court will not overturn a trial court's award of attorney's fees absent
a clear showing the trial court abused its discretion. Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438,442,
444 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
This issue was preserved in proposed findings of fact and in post trial motions. (R.
(R. 148, p. 9; R. 184, p. 6; R. 338, p. 5).
ISSUE NO. 2
Did the Trial Court err in signing the proposed order within four days after the same
being filed with the court and served upon the Appellant?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness according no deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions. Bearden v. Wardley Corp.. 72 P.3d 144 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
This issue was preserved in post trial motions. (R. 270, p. 4).
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ISSUE NO. 3
Did the Trial Court err in its division and valuation of the marital residence?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Factual determinations made by a court are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard. Kunz v. Dept. of Transportation, 949 P.2d 763 (Utah 1997); Rule 52(a), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard of review of a trial court's division of property in a
divorce case is "an abuse of discretion." Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
This issue was preserved in oral argument and in post trial motions. (R. 421, p. 44,
12 - 2 3 ; R. 421, p. 45,20-25, - p.49; R. 421, p. 8, 17-25, - p. 9, 1-7).
ISSUE NO. 4
Did the trial court err in awarding the Appellee a portion of the Appellant's inheritance?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Factual determinations made by a court are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard. Kunz v. Dept. of Transportation. 949 P.2d 763 (Utah 1997); Rule 52(a), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard of review of a trial court's division of property in a
divorce case is "an abuse of discretion." Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
This issue was preserved in oral argument and in post trial motions. (R148, p.5; R.
421, p. 33,6-16; R. 421, p. 95, 7-25; R. 421, p. 96,1-14; R. 421, p. 98,2-9; R. 184, p. 5).
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ISSUE NO. 5
Did The Trial Court Err In Its Division Of Certain Items Of Personal Property And Debt
Between The Parties?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Factual determinations made by a court are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard. Kunz v. Dept. of Transportation, 949 P.2d 763 (Utah 1997); Rule 52(a), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard of review of a trial court's division of property in a
divorce case is "an abuse of discretion." Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
This issue was preserved in oral argument and in post trial motions. (R. 421, p. 66,
14-20; R148, p. 4, 5, 6,7; R. 148, p. 6; R. 421, p. 95,11-17; R. 421, p.96,1-6; R. 184, p.5;
R. 148, p.6, 7; R. 421, p. 92, 18 - p . 93,15; R. 421, p. 92, 18 - p . 93,15; R. 421, R. 338,
P-5).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES
AND RULES
Utah Constitution Art. 1, §7
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h
Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 26(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

NATURE OF THE CASE
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This is an appeal from a final Order and Judgments of the Fifth District Court of
Utah, Washington County, State of Utah, Honorable James L. Shumate, and related
findings of fact and conclusions of law, entered on November 21, 2005, relating to the
division of marital and separate property, division of marital debt, award of alimony, and
award of attorneys fees and costs.
2.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The Appellee and Appellant were married on August 20, 1960, in Dalton,

Massachusetts. (R. 303, p. 2).
B.

The parties separated on March 12, 2004 when the Appellee moved from

the martial home. This was two days after the Appellant underwent heart surgery. (R.
303, p. 2 - 3; R421, p.79, 1; R. 148, p. 2).
C.

After the Appellee movedfromthe marital home, she returned while the

Appellant was absent and removed all documents and other itemsfroma filing cabinet in
the home. The majority of such documents were the personal property of the Appellant
were not marital documents. Additionally, the Appellee removed $400.00 in cash from
such filing cabinet. (R. 148, p.6).
D.

A Bifurcated Decree of Divorce was entered on July 28, 2004. (R. 43).

E.

Temporary Orders were entered on August 10,2004, which among other

things
i.

Awarded the Appellee $ 1,500.00 per month as temporary alimony,

ii.

Awarded the Appellee the temporary use and possession of the home

and furnishings.
8
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iii.

Awarded the Appellee the temporary use and possession of the 1997

Cadillac Deville and the Appellant temporary use and possession of the 2000 GMC
Truck.
iv.

Awarded the Appellee a lump sum support payment of $5,000.00.

v.

Awarded each party one-half of the Exxon Retirement Portion of an

American Funds account; and
vi.

Ordered the Appellant to maintain the Appellee on his health,

medical, dental and optical insurance and submit the costs thereof to the Court at the time
of trial. (R.49;R. 148, p.2).
F.

As a result of the split of the Exxon Retirement account under the Court's

August 10, 2004 Temporary Order, the Appellee and Appellant were each awarded funds
of approximately $125,000.00. (R. 49; R. 421, p. 26, 24-25; R. 148, p. 3).
G.

The issues at trial involved the Appellee's claim for alimony and the

division of marital assets consisting of a home located at 1020 East Fort Pierce Drive, St.
George, Utah, furniture and household furnishings, vehicles, and certain accounts. (R.
421 p. 3,24-25, p. 8, 3-5; R148, p. 3).
H.

The Appellee presented evidence at trial attempting to establish that the

Appellant had engaged in an extramarital affair. Such evidence was disputed and rebutted
by the Appellant and the court found no evidence that an extramarital affair had occurred.
(R. 421, p.70 - p. 89,1-7; R. 148, p. 3).
I.

At the time of trial the Appellee testified that she received the sum of

$635.00 per month from Social Security and $180.73 per month from her retirement plan.
9
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(R. 421, p.8, 8-14; Trial Exhibit 2;). She later testified at a post trial hearing that her
social security was reduced by $75.00 a month. (R. 422, p.5, 19-25, p.6, 1-12).
J.

The Appellee alleged that her monthly expenses exceeded her current

income by $2,489.16. (R. 421, p. 10, 20-25; R. 148, p. 3).
K.

The Appellant receives $1,200.00 per month from Social Security. The

Appellant also works as a real estate agent. During 2004, the Appellant received gross
commissionsfromreal estate sales in the amount of $47,276.43. Of these commissions,
the Appellant received more than half of such commissions ($27,600.00)fromone sale of
a commercial property. This sale was an unusual event and a one-time occurrence. From
January 1, 2005 until the date of trial, March 1,2005, the Appellant had received on
commission the amount of $1,018,12. Thus, the normal average gross commissions
earned by the Appellant from January 1, 2004 through March 1,2005 is $1,476.06 per
month.(R421,p. 11, 10-13; p. 12, 1-10; p. 22, 20-24; R. 148, p. 3-4).
L.

In earning commissions, the Appellant is required to pay certain business

expenses. Evidence presented by the Appellant reflected the payment of business
expenses and taxes in an amount of at least $23,182.60. (R. 421, p. 12, 5-10; R. 421, p.
39, 6-18; Trial Exhibit 19). Thus, the expenses incurred by the Appellant in the operation
of his business exceed his normal average gross commissions by $2,488.05. If the onetime commission of $27,600.00 is added to determine net income, the Appellant's net
income would only average $1,245.58 per month. (R. 148, p.4).
M.

In conducting his business the Appellant has formed a "Team" with other

real estate agents in his office. Such an arrangement is informal and allows the team
10
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members to assist each other and divide commissions accordingly. (R. 421, p. 66, 14-20;
R148, p. 4).
N.

The parties both maintain bank accounts into which their Social Security

and retirement income is deposited. (R148, p. 4).
O.

In conducting his business activities, the Appellant maintains accounts at

State Bank of Southern Utah. Such accounts hold funds deposited by the Appellant and
other Team members and funds derived from the real estate efforts of the Appellant and
other Team members. (R. 148, p.5; R. 184, p. 3).
P.

During the term of the marriage the parties each received an inheritance as a

result of the death of their parents. (R. 421, p. 36, 3-8; Trial Exhibit #7; Trial Exhibit #25;
R. 148, p. 5).
Q.

The Appellee received cash inheritance and General Electric Stock. The

Appellee deposited all cash received by her as inheritance into a separate account and
informed the Appellant that such sums were the Appellee's. At Trial, the Appellee
alleged that she had spent all of the cash received by her as inheritance. (R148, p.5).
R.

The Appellant received cash inheritance of approximately $80,000.00 and

certain items of household furnishings. The Appellant's inheritance was put into an
account with American Funds. The Appellee demanded that such sums be placed into an
account in both of the parties5 names for estate planning purposes. However, at all times,
the Appellant exercised exclusive control over such funds, the parties treated the funds as
Appellant's separate funds, the Appellee made no withdrawals from or otherwise dealt
with the Appellant's inheritance account, and the Appellant exclusively determined for
11
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what purpose such funds would be used. (R148, p.5; Trial Exhibit #7; Trial Exhibit #25;
R. 421, p. 33, 6-16; R. 421, p. 95, 7-25; R. 421, p. 96, 1-14; R. 421, p. 98, 2-9; R. 184, p.
5)
S.

The Appellant used $ 10,000.00 from his inheritance to pay toward the

purchase of the 1997 Cadillac Deville. The Appellant also used his inheritance funds to
purchase a 2000 GMC truck. (R. 148, p. 6; Trial Exhibit #25; R. 421, p. 95, 11-17; R.
421,p.96,1-6; R. 184, p.5).
T.

After the separation and divorce of the parties, the Appellee was involved in

a traffic accident which totaled the Cadillac Deville. The Appellee subsequently
purchased, in her own name, a 2002 Toyota Camry. The Appellee made no
reimbursement to the Appellant for the funds from the Appellant's inheritance used to
purchase the Cadillac Deville and did not credit the Appellant with any funds received
from insurance on account of the damage to the vehicle. (R. 148, p.6).
U.

As part of his inheritance, the Appellant received a bed, dresser, 2 bedroom

end tables, coffee table, 2 living room end tables, lamp table, crystal lamp, large mirror,
marble top table, 2 blue chairs, and a chair used by the parties in their master bathroom.
(R. 148, p.6).
V.

After the parties' separation, the Appellant paid to or for the benefit of the

Appellee, the sum of $6,685.85. The majority of this expense was to pay for medical
insurance premiums and expenses, payment of credit card expenses incurred by the
Appellee, payment of auto insurance covering the Cadillac in the possession of the
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Appellee, and to put money into a joint account after the Appellee had depleted the funds
in the account. (R. 148, p.6; Trial Exhibit 23; Trial Exhibit 24).
W.

After the parties' separation and until the date of judgment, the Appellant

paid insurance premiums of $840.00 to maintain medical insurance solely on the
Appellee. Additionally, the Appellant was required to pay $1,477.19 in co-pay amounts
for services rendered to the Appellee. (R. 421, p. 92, 18 - p. 93, 15), Such payments were
necessary due to the Court's August 10, 2004 temporary order and so as not to jeopardize
the Appellant's own coverage. (R. 148, p.7).
X.

Between August 10, 2004 and the date of trial, the Appellant paid the

Appellee $18,500.00 in temporary alimony. (R. 148, p.7).
Y.

The Appellee is 64 years of age and suffers from several health problems.

While this may limit her ability to work, it does not deprive her of such ability. (R. 421, p.
18, 9 - p. 21, 22; Trial Exhibit #6 ; R. 421, p.43, 6-16; R. 148, p.7).
Z.

The Appellant is 67 years of age and works as a real estate agent. The

Appellant suffers from several health problems, including heart problems, which have,
and will, affect his ability to work. His doctor has advised him that he should cut back on
his activities, including employment. (R421, p. 11, 22-25; R. 421, p. 22, 16 - p . 26, 4; R.
148, p.7).
AA.

At the time the parties purchased the marital home, each party withdrew

$8,000.00 from accounts holding funds each had inherited and used such funds toward
the purchase of the home. (R. 148, p. 8; R. 184, p. 4).
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BB.

At trial, the Appellee presented expert testimony from an appraiser

regarding the value of the marital home. The Appellant objected to such evidence being
presented as the identity, opinion, and basis of the opinion of the expert witness had not
been previously disclosed by the Appellee to the Appellant. The Court overruled the
objection as to the expert's testimony and allowed the appraiser to testify but did not
admit the appraisal report into evidence. (R. 421, p. 44, 12 - 23; R. 421, p. 45, 20 - 25, p.49; R. 421, p. 8, 17-25, - p. 9, 1-7).
CC.

The Court also heard testimony from the Appellant, a real estate agent, and

another real estate agent who works with the Appellant, as to the value of the home. Both
testified that the home was worth between $209,000.00 and $215,000.00. (R. 421, p. 51 p. 56;R.421,p.45, 1).
DD.

There exists a debt on the home in the amount of $82,042.71. (R. 303, p. 8;

Trial Exhibit #12).
EE.

No evidence was presented at trial nor was any claim asserted at trial by

Appellee that the Appellant should pay the GM credit card expense. (R. 421, R. 338, p.
5).
FF.

The parties have no minor children as issue of this marriage. (R. 303, p.3).

GG.

After trial on this matter, the parties submitted proposed findings of fact,

conclusions of law and judgments. (R. 144, R. 148, and R. 161).
HH.

Several months later, the Appellant filed a motion with the Court to

terminate the award of temporary alimony to the Appellee. This motion was based upon
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certain health problems experienced by the Appellant which limited his ability to work.
(R. 242).
II.

The Court set a hearing on Appellant's motion to terminate alimony.

However, due to a conflict in timing, the Appellant obtained a verbal agreement from the
Appellee to continue the hearing and filed a motion and order to continue with the Court.
The hearing was not set for a resolution of the parties' proposed findings. (R. 270 p. 1-2,
5).
KK.

On the original date set for the hearing, the Appellee appeared and

requested that the matter go forward as no order continuing the hearing had been entered.
The Court denied the Appellant's motion to terminate alimony, (R. 422, p. 3, 16-21). took
a proffer of evidence as to the Appellee's then claimed income, (R. 422, p.5, 23-25 and
p.6 1-5) edited, at the bench, a draft of the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
law, (R. 422, p.7, 19-23) and awarded the Appellee judgment against the Appellant in
accordance with the Appellee's request. This hearing was not noticed up for a resolution
of the proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. (R. 422, R. 270, p. 5).
LL.

The Appellant filed a motion to reconsider with the Court. A hearing was

held thereon, after which the Court modified to some degree the prior Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law. These modifications formed the basis for the final Order and
Judgments. (R. 270 and R. 423).
MM. The Appellee mailed the final proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Order and Judgments to Appellant on November 17, 2005. (R. 303 and R.
328).
15
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NN.

Four days after the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and

Judgments were mailed to the Appellant, the Court entered the same. (R. 303. and R.
328).
00.

The Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on December 20,2005. (R. 348).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Issue No. 1

The Trial Court failed to make a finding as to the Appellant's expenses and his
ability to pay attorney's fees. The Trial Court also failed to take into account the
Appellant's own attorney's fees. The Trial Court erred in awarding the Appellee her
attorney's fees when she received ample assets from the marital estate to satisfy her own
attorney's fees where there was no finding of bad faith.
Issue No. 2
The Trail Court entered the final Order and Judgments just four days after it was
filed and served upon the Appellant, thus denying the Appellant due process and violated
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issue No. 3
The Trial Court allowed the testimony of the Appellee's appraiser when he was
never disclosed prior to the morning of trial as required by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Trial Court should have valued the house higher than $185,000.00
given the fact that the market was "hot" and the Appellant and his witness, both real
estate agents testified that the house would sell between $209,000 and $215,000.00.
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Issue No. 4
The Trial Court erred in finding that the Appellant's inheritance was commingled
and lost his identity wherein the inherited funds were deposited into a joint account that
only the Appellant exercised control over.
Issue No. 5
The Trial Court erred in awarding an account that the Appellant shared with his
other team members in his real estate business, ordering the Appellant to pay the debt to
the GMC Credit Card, awarding half of the value of the 2000 GMC truck to the Appellee
and not awarding half of the value of the 2002 Toyota Camry or the insurance proceeds
from the wreck of the 1997 Cadillac Deville.
ARGUMENTS
Issue No. 1
Did The Trial Court Correctly Award Attorney's Fees To The Appellee?
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 allows for the award of attorney's fees in a divorce
action. However, unless the action is an enforcement action where substantially prevailed
on the merits is the standard, the court must look at the parties' ability to pay in
determining whether an award of attorney's fees is appropriate or not.
In Wilde v. Wilde, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "A trial court may award costs
and attorney fees in divorce and modification proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3
(1995), Crockett v.Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Both the decision
to award attorney fees and the amount of such fees are within the trial court's sound
discretion. See Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). However, 'the
17
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award [or denial of such fees] must be based on evidence of thefinancialneed of the
receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the
requested fees/ Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Failure to consider
these factors is grounds for reversal on the fee issue. See Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d
508, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)." Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah 1998).
The appellate court will not overturn a trial court's award of attorney's fees absent
a clear showing the trial court abused its discretion. Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442,
444 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
The Trial Court did make the following findings related to the award of attorney's
fees in its Order and Judgments, "The Appellee has incurred costs and attorney fees
herein in the sum of Fifteen Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-seven Dollars Sixty-nine Cents
($ 15,257.69), through trial. The Appellee borrowed Three Thousand Five Hundred
Dollars ($3,500.00), form her son to pay a retainer to her counsel at the commencement
of this action. The Appellee's counsel submitted an Attorney's Affidavit specifying the
service performed and the charges therefore. The Attorney fees the Appellee agreed to
pay is $175.00 per hour plus the costs of the case. The hourly rate is reasonable in light of
the circumstances of this case and the fees of other experienced lawyers in the community
and the services performed for the Appellee by her counsel were reasonable and
necessary. The Appellee does not have the ability to compensate her counsel and the
Appellant has the ability to pay the Appellee's costs and attorney fees from his
employment and other income and other assets. The Appellant should be ordered to pay
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the Appellee's costs and attorney fees incurred herein in the sum of $10,000.00... ." (R.
303,p.l3).
In marshaling the evidence that supports this finding, the Appellee's net monthly
income was found to be $742.73. (R. 422, p.5, 19-25, p.6, 1-12). The Appellee's also
testified at trial that her monthly need was $3,304.89. Thus, her monthly shortfall before
the alimony award is $2,489.16. (R. 421, p. 10, 20-25; R. 148, p. 3). Appellant was
ordered to pay $1,000.00 per month as alimony. (R. 303, p. 7). The Court also found that
the Appellant was able to earn $2,500.00 per month. (R. 303, p. 7). The Court did not
make a finding as to the Appellant's monthly expenses and his ability to pay spousal
support or attorney's fees. Both parties were awarded $125,000.00 in division of
retirement funds and the Appellee was awarded half the equity in the marital home plus
$8,000.00. (R. 303, p. 8,10).
The Appellee received ample assets to satisfy her own attorney's fee award. It was
not equitable for the Court to award the Appellee her attorney's fees when the Appellant
had incurred his own attorney's fees as well that the Court did not take into account when
deciding to award attorney's fees. The Court also failed to take into account the
Appellant's own expenses in determining the Appellant's ability to pay attorney's fees.
For these reasons, this issue should be overturned and/or remanded for further findings.
ISSUE NO. 2
Did The Trial Court Err In Signing The Proposed Order Within Four Days After The
Same Being Filed With The Court And Served Upon The Appellant?
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1

The Utah Constitution states, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
I
property, without due process of law." Utah Constitution Art. 1, §7.
Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth, "Unless the court
approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise
directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's
decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's
decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service.
The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an
objection or upon expiration of the time to object.''
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness according no deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions. Bearden v. Wardlev Corp., 72 P.3d 144 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).
The Court entered the final Order and Judgments and Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law just four days after service. The Court did not order any time frame
different than the five day provision contained in Rule 7. This was also not an order
submitted based upon the initial memorandum. This is a clear error and should be
reversed.
ISSUE NO. 3
Did The Trial Court Err In Its Division And Valuation Of The Marital Residence?
The Trial Court erred in its division and valuation of the marital residence by allowing
the testimony of the Appellee's appraiser, when he was not disclosed until the morning of
trial and by ignoring the Appellant's $8,000.00 contribution from inherited funds towards the
purchase of the marital residence.
20
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Rule 26(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, "A party shall disclose to other
parties the identity of any person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules
702, 703 or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure effective until May 2, 2005.
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness according no deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions. Bearden v. Wardley Corp., 72 P.3d 144 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).
Factual determinations made by a court are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard. Kunz v. Dept. of Transportation, 949 P.2d 763 (Utah 1997); Rule 52(a), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard of review of a trial court's division of property in a
divorce case is "an abuse of discretion." Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
In marshalling the evidence, the Appellee's expert witness testified that the marital
home was worth $185,000.00. The Appellee testified that she thought the house was worth
$175,000.00. The home also had a debt against it in the amount of $82,042.71. The Appellee
also testified that she used $8,000.00 of her inheritance to purchase the home. The Court
valued the house at $ 185,000.00 and awarded the Appellee one half of the equity in the house
plus $8,000.00 for her contribution from her inheritance.
However, the Court ignored the fact that the Appellant also contributed $8,000.00
from his inheritance and that he testified as a real estate agent that the house was worth
$215,000.00 and he had another real estate agent testify that the house was worth
approximately $209,000.00. In addition to the difference in testimony as to the value of the
house, the Appellant objected to the Appellee's expert witness because he was never
disclosed as an expert witness and his appraisal was never provided to the Appellant prior to
21
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trial. The Court overruled the Appellant's objection and allowed the testimony, but would not
allow the appraisal report. The Court should not have allowed the expert witness testimony
pursuant to Rule 26(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Stevenett v. Wal-Mart
Stores. Inc.. (Utah 1999).
The Court should have not allowed the testimony of the Appellee's appraiser and
should have given more weight and consideration to the testimony of the Appellant and his
witness because of their experience in thefield.The Court erred in allowing the appraiser's
testimony and then in using the appraiser's valuation as the valuation for the marital
residence.
Had the trial court not allowed the appraiser's testimony, then the court would have
had to weigh the Appellee's value of $175,000.00 versus the Appellant's value of
$215,000.00 together with his agent's value of $209,000.00. The Appellant's value of the
house should be given more weight because he works in the field and St. George was
admittedly a "hot market". (R. 421, p. 6, 3-8).
The Trial Court should have also considered the Appellant's contribution of
$8,000.00fromhis inheritance as part of the equation and awarded the Appellant one-half
of the equity plus $8,000.00 just like the Appellee. Because both parties contributed
$8,000.00 of pre-marital funds toward the house, the equity in the house should simply be
divided in half. The value of the house should have been higher than $185,000.00
The Trial Court also prevented the Appellant from accessing his half of the value
of the house by giving the Appellee a life estate in the house. This does not seem
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equitable when the Appellee received over half of the marital estate, and a $1,000.00 a
month award of alimony.
ISSUE NO. 4
Did The Trial Court Err In Awarding The Appellee A Portion Of The Appellant's
Inheritance?
Inheritance is considered separate property and only awarded to the other party if
there is a commingling of the inheritance to the point where the inheritance loses its separate
identity. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988).
Factual determinations made by a court are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard. Kunz v. Dept. of Transportation, 949 P.2d 763 (Utah 1997); Rule 52(a), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard of review of a trial court's division of property in a
divorce case is "an abuse of discretion." Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
In marshalling the evidence, the Appellee stated that the American Funds Account
was a joint account. The Appellant testified that he received $31, 000.00 in an
inheritance. The Appellant deposited these funds into a joint account. The Appellant used
this account to purchase the 2003 GMC pick up and titled the pick up in their joint names.
The Appellant also deposited his earnings into this account. (R. 161, p. 5).
The Appellant does not dispute that the account was a joint account, but he can
trace $32,045.00 to inherited funds. (Trial Exhibit #7). This amount should be taken out
of the account as the Appellant's sole and separate property, unless the court awarded the
two vehicles purchases out of the funds from this account as the Appellant's sole and
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separate property. The Appellant should not lose his inheritance simply because he
placed it into a joint account where the Appellee exercised no control over the account.
Issue No. 5
Did The Trial Court Err In Its Division Of Certain Items Of Personal Property And Debt
Between The Parties?
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5 states, "When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court
may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations,
and parties." Generally, in a divorce proceeding, each party is presumed to be entitled to
all of his or her separate property and 50% of the marital property. Bradford v. Bradford,
993 P.2d 887 (Utah 1999). Overriding consideration in property division is that ultimate
division be equitable, that is, that property be fairly divided between parties given their
contributions during marriage and their circumstances at time of divorce. Each party is
presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and 50% of marital property.
Dunn v.Dunn 802 P.2d 1314, (Utah 1990).
Factual determinations made by a court are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard. Kunz v. Dept. of Transportation, 949 P.2d 763 (Utah 1997); Rule 52(a), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard of review of a trial court's division of property in
a divorce case is "an abuse of discretion." Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).
The Trial Court erred in the following division of the marital property and debts:
A. State Bank of Southern Utah Account:
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The Appellee presented evidence that this account was the Appellant's sole
account and he alone used the account. (R. 161, p. 4). This evidence was presented in the
Appellee's Objection to the Appellant's proposed Findings of Fact and was not stated at
trial. The Appellant specifically stated that these funds were part of his real estate's teams
funds and that they shared the account. (R. 148, p.5; R. 184, p. 3). The Trial Court was
not presented enough evidence to determine that the State Bank of Southern Utah
Account was the Appellant's sole account.
B. GMC Credit Card:
The only evidence presented at trial about the GMC Credit Card was Appellee's
Exhibit #13. There were no statements that this debt should have been awarded to the
Appellant and why. If the Court found that the debt was a marital debt, which it did not
make such finding, then why did it not award the debt to both parties equally. The Court
should not have made a finding that the Appellant was responsible for the GMC Credit
Card.
C. 2000 GMC Truck:
The Court awarded the Appellee one-half of the value of the 2000 GMC Truck
even though the Appellant purchased the vehicle with money from his account wherein
he placed his inheritance. (R. 303, p.l 1). The Appellee presented evidence that the
account was a joint account and that the Appellant placed his earnings into the account.
(R. 161, p.4). However, the Appellant was the only one who exercised control over the
account and could trace over $32,000.00 from the account as his separate property
through inheritance. (R. 184, p. 5).
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D. 2002 Toyota Camry:
The Trial Court failed to place a value on the Toyota Camry, but simply awarded it
and the associated obligation to the Appellee. (R. 303, p. 12). The Court divides the
equity in the Appellant's 2000 GMC Pick Up, but does not divide the Appellee's Camry.
This issue should be remanded for further findings and then equally divided.
E. Insurance Proceeds on 1997 Cadillac Deville:
The Trial Court ignored that after separation the Appellee wrecked the 1997
Cadillac Deville, the Appellant's separate asset or at the very least a marital asset, and
used the insurance proceeds for her own benefit. (R. 148, p. 6). The Appellee presented
evidence that the monies used to purchase the 1997 Cadillac Deville were taken from the
parties' joint account and the vehicle was titled in both the parties' names. (R. 161, p.6).
However, this does not discount the fact that at the very least the insurance proceeds in
marital property and should have been equally divided. The Appellant did testify that the
Cadillac Deville was purchased with separate funds acquired through inheritance. (R.
148, p.6).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons the Court should overturn the award of attorney's fees, remand
the final Order and Judgments because the Court failed to follow due process and Rule 7
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, find that the appraiser's testimony should have been
excluded and the house valued between $209,000 and $215,000.00 and divided
immediately, overturn the trial court's ruling that the Appellant's inherited funds were
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commingled, and overturn the trial court's division of the marital estate in that it was not
equitable.
DATED this / 3

day of July? 2006.

Attorneys for Appellant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Order and Judgments
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ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. USB #0309
Attorney for Judith Wanda Lowry
39 West Main Street
Post Office Box 600
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600"
Telephone: 435 436-8200

#

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WASHINGTON "COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
JUDITH WANDA LOWRY,

:

Petitioner,

. ORDER AND JUDGMENTS

•

:

vs.

:

Civil No. 044500246

KENNETH RAY LOWRY,

:

Assigned to:
Honorable James L. Shumate

Respondent.

:
ooOoo

This action came on for a regularly scheduled trial on
the 1st day of March, 2005, before the Honorable James L. Shumate,
of the Fifth Judicial District Court for Washington County within
the State of Utah.

The Petitioner and the Respondent were present

and represented by their counsel, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., and Gary G.
Kuhlmann, respectively.

The parties presented their documentary

evidence and witnesses and the Court examined the Petitioner and
the Respondent.

The Petitioner and the Respondent each presented

proposed findings of fact, orders and judgments to the Court and
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filed objections thereto.

THE COURT, upon the pleadings on file

herein, the witnesses and documentary evidence presented by the
parties

and

having

made

and

entered

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law and with good cause appearing therefore, hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
1.

The Petitioner is hereby awarded temporary spousal

support which should be paid by the Respondent in the sum One
Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), each month on the 1st day of each
month hereafter and commencing November 1, 2005.

Because the

finding upon the Respondent's income is temporary, either party may
bring this issue back to the Court by motion, rather than by
petition.
2.

The

Petitioner

and

the

Respondent

purchased

a

residence and real property in October, 2002, and during the
marriage situate at 1020 East Fort Pierce Drive in the City of St.
George in the County of Washington within the State of Utah.
The fair market value of the parties' residence and real
property as of February 24, 2005, was One Hundred Eighty-five
Thousand Dollars ($185,000.00).

Accordingly, the parties have just

less than One Hundred Three Thousand Dollars

($103,000.00), of

equity in the marital residence and real property. The Petitioner
paid

Eight . Thousand

Dollars

($8,000.00),

from

her
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separate

inherited funds toward the purchase of the marital residence and
real property.
The Petitioner is awarded the ownership and all right,
title and interest in and to said residence and real property
subject

to the Respondent's

lien for his

share of the .equity

therein in the sum of Forty-seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($47,500.00).
ownership

The

and

all

Petitioner.

The

Respondent
right,

shall

title

Petitioner

and

shall

forthwith

quit

interest

therein

pay

the

payments

claim

the

to

the

and

the

outstanding debt to U.S. Bank on the residence and real property.'
The

Petitioner

shall

live

in the

marital

residence

and

real

property until she dies, or sells the marital residence and real
property.

The sale of the marital residence and real property

shall be in the Petitioner's sole discretion.
not be required to pay the Respondent's

The Petitioner shall

equity lien upon

the

marital residence and real property until she sells the residence
and real property, or re-marries.

In the event Petitioner chooses

not to sell the residence and real property during her lifetime and
the Respondent dies prior to the payment of his equity lien, said
equity lien shall become an asset of the Respondent's estate.
3.

The Respondent has in his possession marital property

which he took with him at the time of separation.
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These items

include

a

refrigerator,

television,

chest

of

drawers,

laptop

computer, lounging chairs, a green desk, the barometer, a crystal
chandelier, golf clubs, fishing gear, camping gear, 2 shop vacuums,
saws, drills and several other tools, all purchased during the
marriage. He also has weapons which were purchased during the
marriage including 3 rifles, a revolver and reloading equipment.
The

Petitioner nor the Respondent made any claim for personal

•property in the possession of the other at the time of trial.
Petitioner

and

the

Respondent

acquired

household

The

furniture,

fixtures, furnishings and appliances and other personal property
during their marriage which have been divided between the parties
and which are awarded pursuant to this division.
4.

Each party should be awarded his or her personal

5.

The Respondent acquired pension, retirement and stock

effects.

benefits during the parties' marriage which are presently held by
American Funds. The Petitioner and the Respondent are each awarded
the ownership of one-half (H), of all pension, retirement and IRA
funds and accounts.

These funds have not yet been divided although

the Petitioner's counsel has submitted a Domestic Relations Order
for execution by the Court.

The Respondent shall forthwith execute

all documents necessary to effectuate the division of the American
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Funds

Accounts

specifically,

but

not

limited

to,

an ' IRA

Distribution Request form provided to the Respondent's counsel by
the Petitioner's counsel on January 4, 2005, which requires the
Respondent's signature guarantee in Section 7.

The guaranteed

signature of the Respondent is required before American Funds - can
distribute the Respondent's pension and retirement IRAs, and he
shall do so forthwith.
6.

The Respondent deposited into' a separate American

Funds account approximately $32,045.00, which he inherited from his
father in 1999.

The Respondent and the Petitioner- created this

account with American Funds in joint tenancy.

The funds in this

account have been commingled and have not remained the separate
property of the Respondent and are marital property.

The American

Funds accounts shall be equally divided between the Respondent and
the Petitioner and the provisions of paragraph 5, of this Order and
the Domestic Relations Order shall apply to the distribution of all
of the said American Funds accounts.
7.

In November 2003, the Respondent purchased a 2000 GMC

Extended Cab 4x4 pickup truck which he paid for in full.
obligation or other liens exist against this vehicle.

No loan

The truck is

titled in the names of the Respondent and the Petitioner.

The

present NADA value of this marital asset exceeds $22,000.00.

The
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Respondent has also added a satellite radio, tool box, fancy wheels
and running boards to this vehicle the value of whiclh is $1,000.00.
The

Respondent

awarded

shall

judgment

forthwith pay the Petitioner and she is

against

the Respondent

in the

sum of Eleven

Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($11,500.00), which is one-half (**) ,
of the value of the 2000 GMC Extra Cab 4x4 pickup truck.
8.

The Petitioner purchased a 2002 Toyota Camry after

the parties' separation because an accident, not the fault of the
Petitioner,

totaled

the

1997

Cadillac

DeVille

driven by

the

Petitioner at the time of separation.

This motor vehicle is titled

solely

The

in the Petitioner's name.

Petitioner owes nearly

$7,000.00, to Box Elder Credit Union upon the 2002 Toyota Camry and
her monthly payment thereon is $129.68, per month.

The ownership

and all right, title and interest in 2002 Toyota Camry, acquired
after the parties' separation by the Petitioner, is awarded to her
and she is ordered to pay the debt thereupon.
9.

The Respondent is ordered to forthwith pay the debt

to the GM credit card in the sum of $4,282.73.
10.

The Petitioner and the Respondent are each awarded

one-half (H) , of the value of the accounts at Southern Utah State
Bank and Zions Bank and all other accounts existing at the time of
the hearing upon the Order to Show Cause.

The Respondent shall
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forthwith pay the Petitioner her one-half

(^) , share of these

accounts and the Petitioner shall be awarded judgment against the
Respondent therefore.
11.

The Petitioner has incurred costs and attorney fees

herein in the sum of Fifteen Thousand Two Hundred

Fifty-seven

Dollars Sixty-nine Cents($15,257.69) , through trial. The Respondent
is ordered to forthwith pay the Petitioner's costs and attorney
fees incurred herein in the sum of $10,000.00', and she is awarded
judgment against the Respondent therefore.

Said judgment shall be

augmented by the Petitioner's costs and attorney fees incurred
after trial and in the collection of the judgments and enforcement
of the orders entered herein.
DATED this

2 j

day of November, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

HONQB^fiLE JAMES
Fifth Judicial District Court
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING

nt

day of November,
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
2005, I served upon and mailed, postage prepaid and by first class
mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and Judgments
to Gary G. Kuhlmann, Attorney for Respondent, at 113 East 200
North, Suite 1, Post Office Box 910387, St. George, Utah 84791.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

\i r^\ i v
CM

ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. USB #030 9
Attorney for Judith Wanda Lowry
39 West Main Street
Post Office Box 600
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600
Telephone: 435 436-8200
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IN THE FIFTH" JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
. .JUDITH WANDA LOWRY, •
Petitioner,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

vs.

:

Civil No. 044500246

KENNETH RAY LOWRY,

:

Assigned to:
Honorable James L. Shumate •

Respondent.

:
ooOoo

This action came on for a regularly scheduled trial on
the 1st day of March, 2005, before the Honorable- James L. Shumate,
of the Fifth Judicial District Court for Washington County within
the State of Utah.

The Petitioner and the Respondent were present

and represented by their counsel, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., and Gary G.
Kuhlmann, respectively.

The parties presented their documentary

evidence and witnesses and the Court examined the Petitioner and
the Respondent.

The Petitioner and the Respondent each presented

proposed findings of fact, orders and judgments to the Court and
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1

filed objections thereto.

THE COURT, upon the pleadings on file

herein, the witnesses and documentary evidence presented by the
parties and with good cause appearing therefore, now makes and
enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. * The Petitioner and the Respondent were residents of
the County of Washington within the State of Utah for three (3),
months prior to the commencement of this action.
2.

The Petitioner and the Respondent were married on the

20th day of August, 1960, in City of Dalton within the State of
Massachusetts, and have been married in the LDS Temple and have
since remained husband and wife, a period of nearly forty-three
(43)., years.

This is a marriage of long-term.

3.
physical

The

affection

Respondent
for

refused

several

to

months

give

prior

the

Petitioner

to the parties''

separation and told the parties7 children he wanted a divorce from
the Petitioner.

There was insufficient evidence presented at trial

to find that the Respondent was having an extra-marital affair.

On

March 12, 2004, two days after the Respondent had heart surgery,
the

Petitioner

and

the

Respondent

had

an

argument

and

the

Petitioner was driving to Salt Lake to visit her children.

The

Petitioner called the Respondent and asked if she should return
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home to work out the problem.

The Respondent told the Petitioner

to Mkeep going North and don't come home."

The Respondent has told

the Petitioner that he wants a divorce.

The Petitioner did not

want the divorce

and requested

counseling

he

which

refused.

the Respondent

Irreconcilable

attend marriage

differences

exist

between the parties rendering this marriage no longer viable and
making reconciliation impossible.
...

4. • Four

(4), children

Petitioner and the Respondent.

were

born

as

issue

of

the

All of said children are adults and

are fully emancipated and are not dependent upon the parties for
their support.
•5.

The Petitioner retired

School District in 1994.

from the Shepard

Montana

She receives retirement income from the

State of Montana in the sum of One Hundred Eighty Dollars Seventythree Cents ($180.73), per month.

The Petitioner also received

Social Security income at the time of trial in the sum of Six
Hundred Thirty-five Dollars ($635.00), per month, but this sum has
since, been reduced by Seventy-three Dollars

($73.00), per month

since trial and the Petitioner now receives social security income
of Five Hundred Sixty-two ($562.00), per month.
completely disabled.

The Petitioner is

She has had six (6), foot surgeries resulting

from peripheral neuropathy, is in need of further surgeries and
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suffers in continuous pain.
fusing the vertebrae
continuous pain.

The Petitioner has also had surgery

in her neck which causes the

Petitioner

The Petitioner suffers from arthritis and is in

present need of cataract surgery.

Becky Torgerson of the State of

Utah

assessed

Office

of

Rehabilitation

the

Petitioner

and

determined that the Petitioner is disabled which prevents her from
engaging

in

full-time

gainful

employment

and

it

is

highly

questionable whether the Petitioner can engage in even part-time
employment.

Becky Torgerson was subpoenaed by the Petitioner to

testify as to the Petitioner's complete disability but was released
from the subpoena at trial because the parties stipulated that the
Petitioner was completely' disabled.

The Petitioner is receiving

both physical therapy and other therapy, and the copay cost thereof
is One Hundred Twenty Dollars ($120.00), per month.
6.

The Respondent receives Social Security income in

excess of One Thousand Two Hundred Five Dollars ($1,205.00), per
month.

The Respondent

deposited

into the parties joint bank

account funds from his retirement account and his social security
from June, 2003, through April, 2004, the eleven (11), months prior
to the

parties'

separation,

in

averages $3,842.30, per month.
income from his employment

the

sum

of $42,265.35, which

These deposits did not include his

at Century 21 Real Estate nor the
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Petitioner's social security and retirement income.
The Respondent deposited his income from Century 21, into
the State Bank of Southern Utah during the parties marriage.
July 16, 2005,

the Respondent

testified

On

that he had earned a

commission of $27,600.00, on June 1, 2004, which he had deposited
into his personal account at the State Bank of Southern Utah and
that all of the funds in this account were his.

The Respondent had

also- deposited several thousand dollars in a separate account at
Zions Bank.

Paragraphs 5, and 7, of the Court's Order Arising from

Order to Show Cause•Hearing refer to these accounts and ordered the
division of these accounts reserved

for trial and any amounts

withdrawn therefrom offset against any other amount awarded at the
time of trial.

The Petitioner was paid a lump sum payment of Five

Thousand Dollars

($5,000.00), following the hearing upon the her

order to show cause.
In any event, the monies in the accounts were marital
property having been earned by the Respondent during the marriage
from commissions earned as a real estate agent at Century 21, where
he had been employed since 2002.

The Petitioner and the Respondent

should each be awarded one-half {H) , of the value of the accounts
at Southern Utah State Bank and Zions Bank and all other accounts
existing at the time of the hearing upon the Order to Show Cause.
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7.

The Respondent has had heart surgery and has had

stints placed in his heart and has other medical problems.

The

Respondent is presently employed as a real estate agent at Century
21, in St. George, Utah.

His adjusted gross income from his 1099,

at Century 21 in the year 2.004, was Forty-seven Thousand Two
Hundred

Seventy-six

Dollars

Forty-three

Cents

($47,276.43),

although one of the commissions earned by the Respondent in the
amount of Twenty-seven Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($27,600.00),
was an unusual event.
Century

The Respondent's average monthly income from

21, alone . for the • year 2004, was Three Thousand Nine

Hundred Thirty-nine Dollars Seventy Cents ($.3,939.70).

The Court

finds that the Respondent's earning capacity is limited by his
health status.
The Respondent suffers from coronary and renal artery
disease which bars him from full time work.

If the Respondent

could work full time his income would be Four Thousand Five Hundred
Dollars

($4,500.00), per month.

However, at the date of the

Court's last hearing, November 1, 2005, the Respondent was only
capable of part-time work.

It is also very clear to the Court that

the Respondent's health is in a changing status.

The Court is

unable to fix his earning capacity on a permanent basis due to his
precarious state of health.

At the present time the Court is
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persuaded by the necessary burden of proof, that this Respondent is
now able to earn Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00), per
month.

Because this is a temporary finding, either party may bring

this issue back to the Court by motion, rather than by petition.
8.

The Petitioner's monthly living expenses are Three

Thousand Three Hundred Four Dollars Eighty-nine Cents ($3,304.89),
per month.

Her monthly need for financial or spousal support from

the Respondent

(following the deduction

security and retirement
Thousand

Four

Hundred

of her monthly

income in the sum of
Eighty-nine

Dollars

$742.73)

social
is

Sixteen

Two

Cents

($2,489.16), per month.
The Respondent has no ability to pay said sum as spousal
support from his income.

The Petitioner is entitled to maintain

the standard of living to which the parties have become accustomed
because this is a long-term marriage.
awarded temporary

The Petitioner should be

spousal support which should be paid by the

Respondent in the sum One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), per month
on the 1st day of each month hereafter and said sum is to be paid
from

and

after

November

1,

2005,

to

the

Petitioner

by

the

Respondent.
9.

The

Petitioner

residence and real property

and

the

Respondent

in October,

2002,

purchased

and during
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a

the

marriage situate at 1020 East Fort Pierce Drive in the City of St.
George in the County of Washington within the State- of Utah.

The

purchase price of the parties' home and real property was One
Hundred Forty-nine Thousand Dollars ($149,000.00).
owed

Eighty-two

Thousand

Forty-two

Dollars

U.S. Bank is

Seventy-one

Cents

($82,042.71), as of the date of trial and the payment thereon is
Six Hundred Thirty-eight Dollars Ninety-one Cents ($638.91), per
month.
The Petitioner testified that the present fair market
value of the marital'residence and real property at the time of
trial was One Hundred Seventy-five Thousand Dollars ($175,000.00).
On February 24, 2005, Craig Morley, a licensed, certified
and accredited real estate appraiser of Morley & McConkie, L.C.,
performed an appraisal of the marital residence and real property.
Mr. Morley was qualified as an expert witness as to the value of
the parties7 residence and real property.

Mr. Morley determined

and testified that the fair market value of the parties7 residence
and real property as of February 24, 2005, was One Hundred Eightyfive Thousand Dollars ($185,000.00).

Accordingly, the parties have

just less than One Hundred Three Thousand Dollars ($103,000.00), of
equity in the marital residence and real property. The Petitioner
paid

Eight

Thousand

Dollars

($8,000.00),

from

her
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separate

inherited funds toward the purchase of the marital residence and
real property.
The Petitioner should be awarded the ownership and all
right, title

and

interest

in and to said

residence

and

real

property subject only to the- Respondent's lien for his share of the
equity therein in the sum of Forty-seven Thousand Five Hundred
Dollars ($47,500.00).

The Respondent shall forthwith quit claim

the ownership and all right, title and interest in the. marital
residence and real property to the Petitioner.

The Petitioner

shall pay the outstanding debt to'U.S. Bank on the residence and
real property.

The Petitioner needs to live in the residence

because of her health problems and shall be entitled to live in the
residence until she dies, or sells the marital residence and real
property.

The sale of the marital residence and real property

should be in the Petitioner's sole discretion.

The Petitioner

shall not be required to pay the Respondent's lien upon the marital
residence and real property until she sells the residence and real
property, or re-marries.

In the event the Petitioner chooses not

to sell the residence and real property during her lifetime and the
Respondent dies prior to the payment of his equity lien, said
equity lien shall become an asset of the Respondent's estate.
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10.

The

Respondent

has

in

his possession

marital

property which he took with him at the time.of separation.

These

items include a refrigerator, television, chest of drawers, laptop
computer, lounging chairs, a green desk, the barometer, a crystal
chandelier, golf clubs, fishing gear, camping gear, 2 shop vacuums,
saws, drills and several other tools, all purchased during the
marriage. He also has weapons which were purchased during the
marriage including-3 rifles, a'revolver' and reloading equipment.
The Petitioner nor the Respondent made any claim for personal
property in the possession.of the .other at the time of trial.
Petitioner

and

the

Respondent

acquired

household

The

furniture,

fixtures, furnishings and appliances and other personal property
during their marriage which have been divided between the parties
and which should be awarded pursuant to this division except as
otherwise ordered herein.
11.

Each party should be awarded his or her personal

12.

The Respondent acquired pension, retirement and

effects.

stock benefits during the parties' marriage which are presently
held by American Funds.
although

the

These funds have not yet been divided

Petitioner's

counsel

has

Relations Order for execution by the Court.

submitted

a

Domestic

The Respondent shall

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

forthwith

execute

all

documents

necessary

to

effectuate

the

division of all of the American Funds Accounts specifically, but
not limited to, an IRA Distribution Request form provided to the
Respondent's counsel by the Petitioner's counsel on January 4,
2005,

which

Section 7.

requires

the

Respondent's

signature

guarantee

in

The guaranteed signature of the Respondent is required

before American Funds can distribute the Respondent's pension and
retirement IRAs, and the Respondent shall do so forthwith.
13.
Funds

The Respondent deposited into a separate American

account

inherited
Petitioner
tenancy.

approximately

from

his

created

father
this

$32,045.00,
in

1999.

which

The

he

claims

Respondent

account with American

Funds

and
in

he
the

joint

Thereafter, the Respondent purchased a new GMC pickup

truck with said funds from the joint American Funds account and
this pickup truck was titled jointly with the Petitioner.

The

Respondent later sold the pickup truck and placed the proceeds of
the sale into the American Funds account held in joint tenancy with
the

Petitioner.

The

Respondent

also

added

a portion

of

his

earnings during the marriage to this account during the marriage.
The

funds

in this

account

have been

commingled

remained the separate property of the Respondent.

and have

not

This American

Funds account should be equally divided between the Respondent and
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the Petitioner.
14.

In November 2003, the Respondent purchased a 2000

GMC Extended Cab 4x4 pickup truck which he paid for in full.
loan obligation or other liens exist against this vehicle.

No
The

truck is titled in the names of the Respondent and the Petitioner.
The present NADA value of this marital asset exceeds $22,000.00.
The Respondent has also added a satellite radio, tool box, fancy
wheels and running boards' to this' vehicle the value of which is
$1,000.00.

The value of"this marital asset should be divided

equally between the Respondent and the Petitioner.
15.

The Petitioner purchased a 2002 Toyota Camry after

the parties' separation because an accident, not the fault of the
Petitioner,

totaled

the

1997

Cadillac

DeVille

driven

by

the

Petitioner at the time of separation.

This motor vehicle is titled

solely

The

in the

Petitioner's

name.

Petitioner owes nearly

$7,000.00, to Box Elder Credit Union upon the 2002 Toyota Camry and
her monthly payment thereon is $129.68, per month.

The ownership

and all right, title and interest in 2002 Toyota Camry, acquired
after the parties' separation by the Petitioner, is awarded to her
and she is ordered to pay the debt thereupon.
16.

The only debt of the parties is a GM credit card and

the balance owed thereupon is $4,282.73.

The credit card was used
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during the marriage for family expenses such as bill payments,
Christmas

and

reservations.

birthday

gifts,

airline

tickets

and

motel

The Respondent should be ordered to pay the debt to

the GM credit card in the above stated sum.
17.

The Petitioner has incurred costs and attorney fees

herein in the- sum of Fifteen Thousand Two Hundred
Dollars

Sixty-nine

Petitioner

Cents

borrowed

($15,257.69),

Three

Thousand

through
Five

Fifty-seven

trial.

Hundred

The

• Dollars

($3,500.00), from her son to pay a retainer to her counsel at the
commencement of this action.

The Petitioner's counsel submitted an

Attorney's Affidavit specifying the services performed and the
charges therefore.

The attorney fees the Petitioner agreed to pay

is $175.00 per hour plus the costs of the case.

The hourly rate is

reasonable in light of the circumstances of this case and the fees
of other experienced lawyers in the community and the services
performed for the Petitioner by her counsel were reasonable and
necessary.
her

counsel

The Petitioner does not have the ability to compensate
and

the

Respondent

has

the

ability

to

pay

the

Petitioner's costs and attorney fees from his employment and other
income and other assets.

The Respondent should be ordered to

forthwith pay the Petitioner's costs and attorney fees incurred
herein in the sum of $10,000.00, and the Petitioner is awarded
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judgment against the Respondent therefore.
THE COURT, having made and entered Findings of Fact now
makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court has both in personam

1.

and subject matter

jurisdiction of the parties in this action.
2.

The Petitioner and the Respondent were married on the

20th day of August, I960,' in City of Dalton within the State of
Massachusetts, and have been married in the LDS Temple and have
since remained husband and wife, a period of nearly forty-four
(44), years.

This is a marriage of long-term.

3.

Irreconcilable differences exist between the parties

rendering this marriage no longer viable and making reconciliation
impossible.

The Petitioner should be awarded a divorce against the

Respondent.
4.

Four

(4), children

Petitioner and the Respondent.

were

born

as

issue

of

the

All of said children are adults and

are fully emancipated and are not dependent upon the parties for
their support.
5.

The Petitioner retired

School District in 1994.

from the Shepard Montana

She receives retirement income from the

State of Montana in the sum of One Hundred Eighty Dollars Seventy-
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three Cents
Social
Dollars

($180.73), per month.

Security

income

($635.00),

per

in the
month

The Petitioner also receives

sum of Six Hundred
at

the

time

of

Thirty-five

trial.

The

Petitioner's social security income has been reduced by Seventythree Dollars ($73.00), since trial.

The Petitioner is completely

disabled and unable to engage in gainful employment.
6.

The Respondent receives Social Security income in

excess of One Thousand Two Hundred Five Dollars ($1,205.00), per.
month.

The Respondent

deposited

into the parties

joint

bank

account funds from his retirement account and social security from
June, 2003, through April, 2004, the eleven (11), months prior to
the parties' separation, in the sum of $42,265.35, which averages
$3,842.30, per month.

These deposits did not include his income

from his employment at Century 21 Real Estate nor the Petitioner's
social security and retirement income.
The Respondent deposited his income from Century 21, into
the State Bank of Southern Utah during the parties' marriage.
July

16, 2005, the Respondent

testified

that he had earned

On
a

commission of $27,600.00, on June 1, 2004, which he had deposited
into his personal account at the State Bank of Southern Utah and
that all of the funds in this account were his.

The Respondent had

also deposited several thousand dollars into a separate account at
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Zions Bank.

Paragraphs 5, and 7, of the Court's Order Arising from

Order to Show Cause Hearing refer to these accounts and ordered the
division of these accounts reserved for trial and any amounts
withdrawn therefrom offset against any other amount awarded at the
time of trial.
In any event, the monies in the accounts were marital
property having been earned by the Respondent during the marriage
from commissions earned as a real estate agent at Century 21, where
he had been employed since 2002.

The Petitioner and the Respondent

should each be awarded one-half (H) , of the value of the accounts
existing at the time of the hearing upon the Order to Show Cause.
7.

The Respondent has had heart surgery and has had

stints placed in his heart several years ago and has other medical
problems.

The Respondent is presently employed as a real estate

agent at Century 21, in St. George, Utah.

His adjusted gross

income from his 1099, at Century 21 in the year 2004, was Fortyseven Thousand Two Hundred Seventy-six Dollars Forty-three Cents
($47,276.43), although Twenty-seven Thousand Six Hundred Dollars
($27,600.00),

of

said

sum

was

an

unusual

commission.

The

Respondent's average monthly income from Century 21, alone for the
year 2004, was Three Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-nine Dollars
Seventy

Cents

($3,939.70).

The

Court

concludes
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that

the

Respondent's earning capacity is limited by his health status.
The Respondent suffers from coronary and renal artery
disease which bars him from full-time work.

If the Respondent

could work full time his income would be $4,500.00.
the date

of the

Court's

last

hearing, November

Respondent was only capable of part-time work.

However, at
1,

2005,

the

It is also very

clear to the Court that the Respondent's health is in a changing
The Court is unable to fix his earning capacity on

status.

permanent basis due to his precarious state of health.

a

At the

present time, the Court is persuaded by the" necessary burden of
proof, that this Respondent is now able to earn $2,500.00, per
month.

Because this is a temporary finding, either party may bring

this issue back to the Court by motion, rather than by Petition.
8.

The Petitioner's monthly living expenses are Three

Thousand Three Hundred Four Dollars Eighty-nine Cents ($3,304.89),
per month.

Her monthly need for financial or spousal support from

the Respondent
security
Thousand

(following

and retirement
Four

Hundred

the deduction

income

of her monthly

in the sum of $742.73)

Eighty-nine

Dollars

Sixteen

social
is Two
Cents

($2,489.16), per month.

The Respondent has no ability to pay said sum as spousal
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support from his income.

The Petitioner is entitled to maintain

the standard of living to which the parties have become accustomed
because this is a long-term marriage.

The Petitioner should be

awarded temporary spousal support which should be paid by the
Respondent in the sum of One Thousand Dollars

($1,000.00), per

month on the 1st day of each month hereafter and said sum should be
paid by the Respondent to the Petitioner from and after November 1,
2005, the date of the trial of this action.
9.

The Respondent deposited his income from Century 21,

into the State Bank of Southern Utah during the parties marriage.
On July 16, 2005, the Respondent testified that he had earned a
commission of $27,600.00, on June 1, 2004, which he had deposited
into his personal account at the State Bank of Southern Utah and
that all of the funds in this account were his.

The Respondent had

also deposited several thousand dollars in a separate account at
Zions Bank.

Paragraphs 5, and 7, of the Court's Order Arising from

Order to Show Cause Hearing refer to these accounts and ordered the
division of these accounts reserved for trial and any amounts
withdrawn therefrom offset against any other amount awarded at the
time of trial.

The Petitioner received a lump sum payment of Five

Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), following the hearing upon her order
to show cause.

In any event, the monies in the accounts were
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marital property having been earned by the Respondent during the
marriage from commissions earned as a real estate agent at Century
21, where he had been employed since 2002.

The Petitioner and the

Respondent should each be awarded one-half (^), of the value of the
accounts at Southern Utah State Bank and .Zions Bank and all other
accounts existing at the time of the hearing upon the Order to Show
Cause.

The Respondent should forthwith pay the Petitioner said

sums and she should be awarded a judgment against the Respondent
therefore.
10.
residence

The

Petitioner- and

and real property

the

in October,

Respondent
2002,

purchased

and during

a

the

marriage situate at 1020 East Fort Pierce Drive in the City of St.
George in the County of Washington within the State of Utah.

The

purchase price of the parties' home and real property was One
Hundred Forty-nine Thousand Dollars ($149,000.00).
owed

Eighty-two

Thousand

Forty-two

Dollars

U.S. Bank is

Seventy-one

Cents

($82,042.71), as of the date of trial- and the payment thereon is
Six Hundred Thirty-eight Dollars Ninety-one Cents ($638.91), per
month.
The fair market value of the parties7 residence and real
property as of February 24, 2005, was One Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($185,000.00).

Eighty-five

Accordingly, the parties have just
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less than One Hundred Three Thousand Dollars

($103,000.00), of

equity in the marital residence and real property. The Petitioner
paid

Eight

Thousand

Dollars

($8,000.00),

from

her

separate

inherited funds toward the purchase of the marital residence and
- real property.
The Petitioner should be awarded the ownership and all
right,

title and

interest

in and to

said

residence and

real

property subject to the Respondent's lien for his share of the
equity therein in the sum of Forty-seven Thousand Five Hundred
Dollars ($47,500.00).

The Petitioner shall pay the payments and

debt to U.S. Bank upon the residence and real property.

The

Respondent should forthwith quit claim the ownership and all right,
title and interest therein to the Petitioner.

The Petitioner

should be entitled to reside in the marital residence and real
property until she dies, or until the home and real property are
sold.

The sale of the marital residence and real property shall be

in the Petitioner's sole discretion.

The Petitioner shall not be

required to pay the Respondent's lien until such time as she sells
the marital residence and real property, or re-marries.

In the

event that the Petitioner chooses not to sell the residence and
real property and the Respondent dies before his equity lien is
paid

to him,

said

equity

lien shall become

an asset
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of the

Respondent's estate.
11.

The

Respondent

has

in

his

possession

marital

property which he took with him at the time of separation.

These

items include a refrigerator, television, chest of drawers, laptop
computer, lounging chairs, a green desk, the barometer, a crystal
chandelier, golf clubs, fishing gear, camping gear, 2 shop vacuums,
saws, drills and several other tools, all purchased during the
marriage. He also' has weapons which were purchased during the
marriage including 3 rifles, a revolver and reloading equipment.
The Petitioner nor the •Respondent made• any claim for
personal property in the possession of the other at the time of
trial.

The

Petitioner

and

the Respondent

acquired

household

furniture, fixtures, furnishings and appliances and other personal
property during their marriage which have been divided between the
parties and which should be awarded pursuant to this division.
12.

Each party should be awarded his or her personal

13.

The Respondent acquired pension, retirement

effects.
and

stock benefits during the parties' marriage which are presently
held by American Funds.
although

the

These funds have not yet been divided

Petitioner's

counsel

has

Relations Order for execution by the Court.

submitted

a

Domestic

The Respondent should

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

forthwith

execute

all

documents

necessary

to

effectuate

the

division of all of the American Funds Accounts specifically, but
not limited to an IRA Distribution Request form provided to the
Respondent's counsel by the Petitioner's counsel on January 4,
2005,

which

Section 7.

requires

the

Respondent's

signature

guarantee

in

The guaranteed signature of the Respondent is required

before American Funds can distribute the Respondent's pension and
retirement IRAs.
14.

The Respondent deposited into a separate American

•Funds account approximately $32,045.00, which he inherited from his
father in 1999.

The Respondent and the Petitioner created this

account with American Funds in joint tenancy.

Thereafter, the

Respondent purchased a new GMC pickup truck with said funds from
the joint American Funds account and this pickup truck was titled
jointly with the Petitioner.

The Respondent later sold the pickup

truck and placed the proceeds of the sale into the American Funds
account held in joint tenancy with the Petitioner.

The Respondent

then purchased the 2000 GMC pickup truck referred to below and
titled this vehicle in the parties' names jointly.

The Respondent

also added a portion of his earnings during the marriage to this
account during the marriage.
commingled

The funds in this account have been

and have not remained the separate property of the
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Respondent.
should

be

The American Funds accounts are marital property and
equally

Petitioner.

divided

between

the

Respondent

and

the

A qualified domestic relations order should issue to

effectuate the division of all retirement, pension, IRA, and other
.accounts.
15.

In November 2003, the Respondent purchased a 2000

GMC Extended Cab 4x4 pickup truck which he paid for in full.
loan obligation or other liens exist against this vehicle.

No
The

truck is titled in the names of the Respondent and the Petitioner.
The present NADA value of this marital asset exceeds $22,000.

The

Respondent has also added a satellite radio, tool box, fancy wheels
and running boards to this vehicle the value of which is $1,000.00.
The value of the equity in this marital asset should be divided
equally between the Respondent and the Petitioner.
16.

The Petitioner purchased a 2002 Toyota Camry after

the parties' separation because an accident, not the fault of the
Petitioner,

totaled

the

1997

Cadillac

DeVille

driven

by

the

Petitioner at the time of separation.

This motor vehicle is titled

solely

The

in the Petitioner's

name.

Petitioner

owes

nearly

$7,000.00, to Box Elder Credit Union upon the 2002 Toyota Camry and
her monthly payment thereon is $12 9.68, per month.

The ownership

and all right, title and interest in 2002 Toyota Camry, acquired
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after the parties7 separation by the Petitioner is awarded to her
and she is ordered to pay the debt thereupon.
17.

The only debt of the parties is a GM credit card and

the balance owed thereupon is $4,282.73.

The credit card was used

during the marriage for family expenses such as bill payments,
Christmas

and

reservations.

birthday

gifts,

airline

tickets

and

motel

The Respondent should be ordered to pay the debt to

the GM credit card in the above stated sum;
18.

The Petitioner has incurred costs and attorney fees

herein in the sum of Fifteen Thousand Two' Hundred' Fifty-seven
Dollars

Sixty-nine

Petitioner

Cents

borrowed

($15,257.69),

Three

Thousand

through
Five

trial.

Hundred

The
Dollars

($3,500.00), from her son to pay a retainer to her counsel at the
commencement of this action.

The Petitioner's counsel submitted an

Attorney's Affidavit specifying the services performed and the
charges therefore.

The attorney fees the Petitioner agreed to pay

is $175.00 per hour plus the costs of the case.
The
circumstances
lawyers

in

hourly

rate

is

reasonable

of this case and the fees

the

community

and

the

in

light

of other

of

the

experienced

services performed

for

Petitioner by her counsel were reasonable and necessary.

the
The

Petitioner does not have the ability to compensate her counsel and
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the Respondent has the ability to pay the Petitioner's costs and
attorney fees from his employment and other income and assets.
The Respondent should be ordered to pay the Petitioner's
costs and attorney fees incurred herein in the sum of $10 7 000.00,
and

the

Respondent

Petitioner
therefore

should

be

awarded

judgment

augmented by the costs

against

and attorney

the
fees

incurred in the collection of the judgments entered herein.
DATED this QJ

day of November",' 2005.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE JAMES L.. SHUT^ATE,
Fifth Judicial District Court
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of November,
2005, I served upon and mailed, postage prepaid and by first class
mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law to Gary G. Kuhlmann, Attorney for Respondent, at
113 East 200 North, Suite 1, Post Office Box 910387, St. George,
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